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Abstract
Background: The COVID-19 infodemic, a surge of information and misinformation, has sparked worry about the public’s
perception of the coronavirus pandemic. Excessive information and misinformation can lead to belief in false information as well
as reduce the accurate interpretation of true information. Such incorrect beliefs about the COVID-19 pandemic might lead to
behavior that puts people at risk of both contracting and spreading the virus.
Objective: The objective of this study was two-fold. First, we attempted to gain insight into public beliefs about the novel
coronavirus and COVID-19 in one of the worst hit countries: the United States. Second, we aimed to test whether a short
intervention could improve people’s belief accuracy by empowering them to consider scientific consensus when evaluating claims
related to the pandemic.
Methods: We conducted a 4-week longitudinal study among US citizens, starting on April 27, 2020, just after daily COVID-19
deaths in the United States had peaked. Each week, we measured participants’ belief accuracy related to the coronavirus and
COVID-19 by asking them to indicate to what extent they believed a number of true and false statements (split 50/50). Furthermore,
each new survey wave included both the original statements and four new statements: two false and two true statements. Half of
the participants were exposed to an intervention aimed at increasing belief accuracy. The intervention consisted of a short
infographic that set out three steps to verify information by searching for and verifying a scientific consensus.
Results: A total of 1202 US citizens, balanced regarding age, gender, and ethnicity to approximate the US general public,
completed the baseline (T0) wave survey. Retention rate for the follow-up waves— first follow-up wave (T1), second follow-up
wave (T2), and final wave (T3)—was high (≥85%). Mean scores of belief accuracy were high for all waves, with scores reflecting
low belief in false statements and high belief in true statements; the belief accuracy scale ranged from –1, indicating completely
inaccurate beliefs, to 1, indicating completely accurate beliefs (T0 mean 0.75, T1 mean 0.78, T2 mean 0.77, and T3 mean 0.75).
Accurate beliefs were correlated with self-reported behavior aimed at preventing the coronavirus from spreading (eg, social
distancing) (r at all waves was between 0.26 and 0.29 and all P values were less than .001) and were associated with trust in
scientists (ie, higher trust was associated with more accurate beliefs), political orientation (ie, liberal, Democratic participants
held more accurate beliefs than conservative, Republican participants), and the primary news source (ie, participants reporting
CNN or Fox News as the main news source held less accurate beliefs than others). The intervention did not significantly improve
belief accuracy.
Conclusions: The supposed infodemic was not reflected in US citizens’ beliefs about the COVID-19 pandemic. Most people
were quite able to figure out the facts in these relatively early days of the crisis, calling into question the prevalence of
misinformation and the public’s susceptibility to misinformation.
(J Med Internet Res 2021;23(1):e24069) doi: 10.2196/24069
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Introduction
Public health crises tend to go hand in hand with information
crises. The COVID-19 pandemic, which is taking many lives
and is hospitalizing hundreds of thousands of people globally,
is no exception. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, we
are seeing signs of a misinformation pandemic. Around the first
peak of the coronavirus outbreak in the United States, the
country with the highest COVID-19 death toll [1], about
two-thirds of Americans said they had been exposed to at least
some made-up news and information related to the virus [2].
Misinformation about the pandemic seems to have proliferated
quickly, especially on social media [3]. The World Health
Organization (WHO) has labelled this surge of information and
misinformation about the COVID-19 pandemic an infodemic
[4].
Countries and social media platforms are trying to tackle this
infodemic in a number of ways. Several social media platforms,
including Facebook and Twitter, have implemented new
procedures to remove or label false and misleading content
[5,6]. However, with the vast number of posts made to these
platforms every day and the platforms’ fear of infringing on
free speech, the success of these procedures is limited (eg, [7]).
A second strategy consists of surfacing trusted content, for
instance, by referring people with questions to the WHO or to
national health agencies, such as the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention in the United States and the National
Epidemiology Center in Brazil. This approach might be hindered
by government officials, including US president Donald Trump
and Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro, actually contributing to
the spread of misinformation (eg, [8,9]). Considering this
apparent infodemic, are people able to distinguish facts from
fiction? And what correlates might enable or disable them in
forming accurate beliefs?
One promising approach to limiting the effects of
misinformation was already on the rise before the COVID-19
pandemic: increasing misinformation resistance through
educational interventions. A substantial number of countries
have implemented educational interventions, primarily focused
on media literacy [10], which can be understood as the ability
to access, analyze, evaluate, and communicate messages in a
variety of forms [11]. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency,
for instance, has included a section about misinformation in its
public emergency preparedness brochure, advising Swedes to
be aware of the aim of information and to check the source of
information, among others [12]. Similarly, Facebook tries to
help its users recognize misinformation by providing 10 tips
[13]. One advantage of such a focus on media literacy is that it
can help prevent problems with misinformation, instead of
having to correct false beliefs after they have taken hold.
Previous media literacy research, with interventions focusing
on identification of misinformation, has yielded promising
results indicating that some interventions can reduce the
perceived accuracy of misinformation [14,15]. Other research
highlights the difficulties in crafting media literacy interventions
[16]. Can these types of interventions, focusing on
empowerment of media consumers, help individuals deal with
the supposed COVID-19 infodemic?
Our approach focuses on helping individuals figure out what is
true and what is false, considering false such beliefs about
factual matters that are not supported by clear evidence and
expert opinion [17]. We test an intervention that empowers
people to search for and identify scientific consensus.
Communicating scientific consensus (ie, a high degree of
agreement between scientists) is effective in eliciting
scientifically accurate beliefs [18]. This effectiveness is
described in the gateway belief model, which states that people’s
perceived scientific consensus functions as a gateway to their
personal factual beliefs [19,20]. Here, we focus on empowering
individuals to search for and identify scientific consensus,
because this approach is more flexible than communicating a
scientific consensus on every single issue.
The current strategy is considered a boosting approach. Boosting
encompasses interventions targeting competence rather than
immediate behavior [21]. In line with this, our intervention
focuses on improving people’s skills to form accurate beliefs,
instead of altering the external context within which people
form beliefs. In addition, our boosting approach can be
considered an educational intervention, just like media literacy
interventions. However, compared to media literacy
interventions that target the identification of misinformation,
boosting consensus reasoning is not dependent on being exposed
to misinformation. One can investigate any claim, true or false,
from any source.
This study had two main goals. One involved an exploratory,
not preregistered, investigation to gain insight into the effects
of the supposed infodemic on individuals’ belief accuracy in
times of crisis, and to investigate potential correlates of belief
accuracy. The second goal was a preregistered test of the
boosting intervention aimed at increasing belief accuracy.
Accordingly, we hypothesized that our intervention would lead
to more accurate beliefs about the COVID-19 pandemic than
the control condition; the complete preregistration can be found
on the Open Science Framework (OSF) [22]. The research was
conducted online, and a balanced sample of the US population
was recruited. We decided to focus on the United States, because
this is arguably the country worst hit by the COVID-19
pandemic. Using a longitudinal design, measuring beliefs about
the pandemic over 4 weeks just after daily confirmed COVID-19
deaths had peaked at over 4000, allowed us to investigate belief
formation in the relatively early days of the pandemic. All data
and material are available on the project page on the OSF [23].
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We used Prolific, a UK-based online crowdsourcing platform
that connects researchers to participants, to collect data from
US citizens over a 4-week period. Prolific has been
demonstrated to yield high-quality data and more diverse
participants than student samples or other major crowdsourcing
platforms [24]. In addition, it allowed for recruitment that
balanced age, gender, and ethnicity to approximate the US
general public, via stratification using US census data [25].
Recruitment for the initial baseline wave started on April 27,
2020.
A total of 1212 individuals participated in the study at baseline
(T0), for which they received £0.45 (~US $0.56). A total of
1089 individuals participated in the first follow-up wave (T1),
1070 individuals participated in the second follow-up wave
(T2), and 1028 individuals participated in the final wave (T3);
see Table 1 for total sample size, exclusions, and final sample
size per wave. Participants received £0.33 (~US $0.41) for
participation per follow-up survey. Each of the waves was
separated by approximately one week (meanT0-T1 6.98 days, SD
T0-T1 14.92 hours; meanT1-T2 7.01 days, SD T1-T2 12.72 hours;
meanT2-T3 7.06 days, SD T2-T3 13.18 hours). The sample size
was determined by the available resources. This study is part
of a research project that was reviewed and approved by the
Ethics Committee Social Science at Radboud University
(reference No. ECSW-2018-056).
Table 1. Total sample size, exclusions, and final sample size per wave.
Retention rate, %aValue, n (%)Wave and sample
















aThe retention rate is based on the final sample sizes of T0 and the respective wave. Total sample sizes of follow-up waves were counted, excluding 2
participants who should have been excluded but had been allowed to participate in the follow-up waves due to a technical error.
bN/A: not applicable; retention rates were calculated using final sample sizes of T0 and the follow-up waves.
cMore details on exclusions can be found in the Statistical Analysis, Data Exclusion section.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to either receive the
intervention (ie, the boost condition) or no intervention (ie, the
control condition). All surveys started with the measure of belief
accuracy, for which participants were presented with 10 (T0),
14 (T1), 18 (T2), or 22 (T3) statements about the coronavirus
and COVID-19 (see Figure 1). Participants indicated to what
extent they believed each statement to be true. An attention
check was included among these statements (see Multimedia
Appendix 1). Subsequently, participants reported their behavior
aimed at preventing the spread of the coronavirus and completed
the other measures. The boosting intervention, an infographic
presenting three steps that can be used to evaluate a claim, was
included at the end of T0, T1, and T2. Only participants in the
boost condition were presented with the infographic, allowing
them to apply their boosted consensus reasoning skill in the
week leading up to the next wave. At T3, all participants
completed a manipulation check. At the end of T0, all
participants entered demographic information and completed a
seriousness check (see Multimedia Appendix 1). All surveys
took about 3 to 6 minutes.
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Figure 1. Flowchart of the main elements of the procedure per wave. Participants first completed the measure of belief accuracy, then completed other
measures, and, finally, were exposed to the intervention or not. At T3, participants completed a manipulation check. The bottom panels of the first three
columns display the intervention condition (left; infographic) and the control condition (right; no intervention). T0: baseline; T1: first follow-up wave;
T2: second follow-up wave; T3: final wave.
Materials and Measures
Belief Accuracy
The key dependent variable was the accuracy of participants’
beliefs related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This variable
consisted of responses to a number of statements about the
pandemic, which were sourced from preprints of early research
on public perceptions of COVID-19 (eg, [26]), public health
agencies and medical institutes (eg, the WHO), media tracking
organizations (eg, NewsGuard), and expert reports in established
media (eg, CNBC); a comprehensive list of these resources is
available in Multimedia Appendix 2. Only statements based on
scientific claims were included in order to make sure that there
was compelling evidence that the claims were either true or
false.
At T0, participants were exposed to 10 statements, of which
five were scientifically accurate (eg, “Fever is one of the
symptoms of COVID-19”) and five were at odds with the best
available evidence (eg, “Radiation from 5G cell towers is
helping spread the coronavirus”). Participants responded by
indicating the accuracy of a statement as follows: false, probably
false, don’t know, probably true, or true. In each subsequent
wave, four new statements were added to the list of statements:
two accurate ones and two inaccurate ones. This allowed us to
keep the belief accuracy measure current, reflecting
contemporary insights and discussion points. The order of the
statements was randomized per participant and varied per wave.
A belief accuracy score was calculated by converting the
response to each statement to a number reflecting how accurate
the response was; a correct judgment was counted as 1 and an
incorrect judgment was counted as –1. A less certain but correct
probably true or probably false counted as 0.5 and an incorrect
one as –0.5. Finally, a don’t know response was counted as 0.
Average scores were calculated per wave per participant,
resulting in a repeated measure of belief accuracy. Internal
consistency was acceptable to good across the four waves; the
McDonald ωt was between 0.75 and 0.87 in all waves.
Coronavirus-Related Behavior
Coronavirus-related behavior aimed at preventing the
coronavirus from spreading was measured by asking participants
to indicate their agreement with three statements. The statements
were “To prevent the coronavirus from spreading...” (1) “I wash
my hands frequently,” (2) “I try to stay at home/limit the times
I go out,” and (3) “I practice social distancing (also referred to
as ‘physical distancing’) in case I go out”; agreement was
measured on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree). Scores were averaged per wave per participant. Internal
consistency was acceptable to good across the four waves; the
McDonald ωt was between 0.77 and 0.83 in all waves.
Additional Measures
Trust in scientists was measured in all four waves with responses
to the statement “I trust scientists as a source of information
about the coronavirus.” Participants responded on a 7-point
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Participants’ primary news source for information about the
COVID-19 pandemic was identified by asking them at T0 what
their main source of news about the coronavirus was.
Participants could choose one option from a list of 11 news
sources, based on data from the Pew Research Center on
Americans’ news habits [27].
Finally, we included a manipulation check at T3. This consisted
of asking participants how they evaluated the truthfulness of
the statements about the coronavirus and coronavirus disease
in the study over the past weeks. We asked them to name the
steps that they took to evaluate the claims in three open text
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boxes, of which at least one had to be used. These answers were
coded by the first author to indicate whether they mention
consensus—or something similar—or not. A second coder coded
a random subset of 120 answers, with Krippendorff α indicating
good (α=.85) interrater reliability. Therefore, the complete
coding from the first author was used in the analyses.
Not all measures included in the study are listed here, because
not all measures are relevant here. Please see the material on
the project page on the OSF for the remaining measures [23].
Intervention
The boosting intervention that was included at the end of T0,
T1, and T2 consisted of a short infographic that was aimed at
empowering participants to use scientific consensus when
evaluating claims related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The
infographic set out three steps that can be used to evaluate a
claim: (1) searching for a statement indicating consensus among
scientists, (2) checking the source of this consensus statement,
and (3) evaluating the expertise of the consensus. The
infographic can be found in Multimedia Appendix 3. Participants
in the control condition were not exposed to the infographic.
Demographics
Demographics including political orientation, age, gender,
ethnicity, and education were asked about at T0. Political
orientation was measured by combining political identity (ie,
strong Democrat, Democrat, independent lean Democrat,
independent, independent lean Republican, Republican, or strong
Republican) and political ideology (ie, very liberal, liberal,
moderate, conservative, or very conservative) into one numeric,
standardized measure centered on 0 (ie, moderate, independent),
based on Kahan [28].
Statistical Analysis
Data Exclusion
First, we removed one of two duplicate responses at T1 and
excluded all responses from one participant with three varying
responses at T3.
As preregistered, participants who failed the attention check at
T0 were excluded and replaced (n=8; including 2 who had been
allowed to participate in the follow-up waves due to a technical
error). If a participant failed one of the attention checks in the
subsequent waves, data from that wave was not included in the
analyses (nT1=5, nT2=2, nT3=5), but other surveys in which the
attention check was passed were retained. Participants who
indicated at the T0 seriousness check that their data should not
be used were excluded from further participation and their data
were not used, but they were not replaced (n=2). No participants
completed T0 in less than 1 minute, but if a participant
completed a subsequent wave in less than 1 minute, data from
that survey were not included in the analyses (nT1=6, nT2=1,
nT3=0). Other waves in which the 1-minute threshold was passed
were retained.
Exploratory Analyses
General increase in belief accuracy over time was explored
using linear mixed modeling for each set of statements, with
wave as predictor, controlling for political orientation and
including a random intercept per participant. The relationship
between belief accuracy and coronavirus-related behavior was
explored with correlations for each wave. The relationship of
belief accuracy with trust in scientists at T0, political orientation,
and primary news source was explored using mixed modeling,
controlling for wave, age, gender, education, and ethnicity. The
interaction term between trust and political orientation was
included in the model. The five most chosen news sources (ie,
CNN, Fox News, NPR, social media sites, and The New York
Times, excluding the option Other sources) were included as
dummy-coded variables. Finally, we included a random intercept
and a random slope for wave per participant. Mixed modeling
was performed with the lme4 package [29] in R (The R
Foundation) [30]. The models were examined using likelihood
ratio tests, using the R package lmerTest [31].
Preregistered Analysis
The hypothesis that our intervention would lead to more accurate
beliefs than would the control condition was also tested using
linear mixed modeling. The condition (ie, intervention vs
control) and wave, and the interaction between condition and
wave, were included as predictors in the model. Political
orientation was included as a covariate, because beliefs about
the COVID-19 pandemic are related to political ideology [32],
and a random intercept and a random slope for wave were
included per participant. The hypothesis was tested by
comparing the full model, with the interaction between condition
and wave, to a model without this interaction effect. We used
the PBmodcomp function from the R package pbkrtest [33] for
parametric bootstrapping (10,000 simulations).
Results
Participants
The final sample roughly reflects US census data [25] on gender,
age, and ethnicity, indicating that the balanced sampling worked
well. See Table 2 for more details.
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Table 2. Participant characteristics.



















aDue to rounding, percentages may not add up to 100% exactly.
bThe percentages in the census data reflect the population aged 18 years and over.
cN/A: not applicable.
Belief Accuracy
Mean scores of belief accuracy were very high for all waves,
with scores reflecting low belief in false statements and high
belief in true statements. There was substantial variation in the
accuracy of responses between statements, although none of
the statements was ever interpreted with less than 0.25 accuracy,
on average; see Multimedia Appendix 4 for a complete overview
of scores per statement per wave.
There was a modest increase in belief accuracy over time,
looking at each set of statements separately (first 10:
estimate=0.02, SE<0.01; t3202.59=13.82, P<.001; T1 set:
estimate=0.01, SE<0.01; t2041.94=4.80, P<.001; T2 set:
estimate=0.02, SE<0.01; t1003.22=3.40, P<.001). This increase
was positive for all three sets of statements that were asked
more than once (see Figure 2 [34,35]), indicating that
participants became more accurate in their interpretation of the
statements over time.
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Figure 2. Belief accuracy per set of statements over time. The new set at T3 was included for completeness. Focusing on within-subject change, dots
represent normed means and error bars indicate 95% CIs of the within-subject SE [34], calculated using the summarySEwithin function from the Rmisc
package [35]. The belief accuracy scale ranged from –1, indicating completely inaccurate beliefs, to 1, indicating completely accurate beliefs. T1: first
follow-up wave; T2: second follow-up wave; T3: final wave.
Coronavirus-Related Behavior
Accurate beliefs were correlated with self-reported behavior
aimed at preventing the coronavirus from spreading; r at all
waves was between 0.26 and 0.29 and all P values were less
than .001. This small but robust correlation suggests that
accurate beliefs could be important for coronavirus-related
behavior. We explored potential evidence of any causal effects
in the data using a random-intercept cross-lagged panel model.
This yielded a tentative indication that accurate beliefs might
be predictive of behavior, with belief accuracy at T2 predicting
coronavirus-related behavior at T3. However, with all other
paths showing no sign of significant predictive effects, the
results regarding causality are largely inconclusive (see
Multimedia Appendix 5).
Associations With Belief Accuracy
We explored the relationship of trust in scientists at T0, political
orientation, and the primary news source with belief accuracy.
The mixed model yielded a significant positive relationship
between belief accuracy and trust (estimate=0.07, SE<0.01;
t1200.23=16.44, P<.001) and a significant negative correlation
with political orientation (estimate=–0.02, SE<0.01;
t1199.62=–6.78, P<.001). These main effects indicated that
participants with higher trust in scientists scored higher on the
measure of belief accuracy and that liberal, Democratic
participants held more accurate beliefs than conservative,
Republican participants. Moreover, these main effects were
partially qualified by an interaction effect among trust and
political orientation (estimate=–0.01, SE<0.01; t1195.05=–3.62,
P<.001). Plotting of this interaction effect demonstrated that
trust in scientists had a stronger relationship with belief accuracy
for liberal, Democratic participants than it had for conservative,
Republican participants (see Figure 3).
Two of the five most chosen primary news sources were
associated with a worse understanding of the facts regarding
the COVID-19 pandemic than others (see Figure 4). Participants
who reported CNN (estimate=–0.03, SE=0.01; t1194.49=–2.33,
P=.02) or Fox News (estimate=–0.05, SE=0.02; t1202.49=–3.05,
P=.002) as their main news source scored below average on
belief accuracy.
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Figure 3. Linear relationship between belief accuracy (averaged over wave for plotting) and trust in scientists at T0 (baseline), split by political
orientation (dichotomized for plotting). The grey area represents the 95% CI. The belief accuracy scale ranged from –1, indicating completely inaccurate
beliefs, to 1, indicating completely accurate beliefs. Trust in scientists was measured with responses to the statement “I trust scientists as a source of
information about the coronavirus.” Participants responded on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Figure 4. Box plot of raw (unadjusted) scores of belief accuracy (averaged over wave for plotting) by main news source. The belief accuracy scale
ranged from –1, indicating completely inaccurate beliefs, to 1, indicating completely accurate beliefs.
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We conducted a manipulation check and, as expected, when
asked how they evaluated claims, participants in the boost
condition (136/600, 22.7%) mentioned consensus, or something
similar, more often than participants in the control condition
(26/602, 4.3%; χ21=85.2, P<.001, N=1202).
We hypothesized that our boosting intervention would lead to
more accurate beliefs about the COVID-19 pandemic than would
the control condition. However, the interaction effect between
condition and wave on belief accuracy was not significant
(estimate<0.01, SE<0.01; t1074.36=0.22, P=.83). This means that
the boosting intervention did not significantly alter belief
accuracy of participants over time, compared to the control
condition (see Figure 5). This was also the case when we
explored effects of the intervention on inaccurate statements
only (P=.48), accurate statements only (P=.49), only the original
10 statements that were included in all waves (P=.61), and only
included participants who scored relatively low on belief
accuracy at T0 (belief accuracyT0<0.76; P=.32).
Figure 5. Belief accuracy per condition over time. Error bars indicate 95% CI focusing on the comparison between experimental conditions, not adjusted
for within-subject variability. The belief accuracy scale ranged from –1, indicating completely inaccurate beliefs, to 1, indicating completely accurate
beliefs.
When the subsample of participants in the boost condition who
mentioned consensus, or similar, in the manipulation check was
compared to participants in the control condition, we again
found that the intervention did not increase belief accuracy
(P=.21). However, there was a main effect of condition
(estimate=0.06, SE=0.02; t725.66=3.50, P=.001), indicating that
participants in the boost condition who did use consensus while
evaluating claims scored higher on belief accuracy than
participants in the control condition. This difference was already
present at T0, so was not caused by the intervention.
We explored the effect of the boosting intervention on trust in
scientists as a source of information about the coronavirus. The
mixed-effects model, similar to the hypothesis test but with the
repeated measure of trust as the dependent variable and
including the interaction term between condition, wave, and
political orientation, yielded a significant three-way interaction
effect between condition, wave, and political orientation
(estimate=0.02, SE=0.01; t1088.42=2.39, P=.02). Trust in
scientists was very high in all four waves (means between 6.11
and 6.19), but investigation of the two-way interaction effects
per condition indicated a significant interaction effect among
wave and political orientation in the control condition
(estimate=–0.02, SE=0.01; t562.01=–3.24, P=.001), while there
was no such significant interaction effect in the boost condition
(P=.90). As illustrated by Figure 6, there was a clear overall
difference in trust in scientists between participants related to
their political orientation. More interestingly, trust remained
stable for all participants in the boost condition, but decreased
slightly for conservative, Republican participants in the control
condition. This could indicate that the boosting intervention
inhibited a decline of trust in scientists as a source of information
about the coronavirus among more conservative, Republican
participants.
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Figure 6. Trust in scientists as a source of information about the coronavirus per condition and political orientation (dichotomized for plotting) over
time. Error bars indicate 95% CI focusing on the comparison between experimental conditions, not adjusted for within-subject variability. Trust in
scientists was measured with responses to the statement “I trust scientists as a source of information about the coronavirus.” Participants responded on
a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Discussion
Principal Findings
The aims of this study were to gain insight into the beliefs of
the US public about the COVID-19 pandemic and to investigate
whether a boosting intervention could improve people’s belief
accuracy. Interestingly, the average scores on belief accuracy
over the surveyed 4-week period were high, indicating low
belief in false statements and high belief in true statements.
Looking at each set of statements, we found a small but
significant increase in belief accuracy over time. This indicates
that the general public is quite able to figure out what is true
and what is not in times of crisis. Moreover, a small but robust
correlation suggests that accurate beliefs about the pandemic
might be important for coronavirus-related behavior.
Associations with belief accuracy suggest that the processes of
belief formation and correction might be affected by individuals’
trust in scientists and political orientation, as well as their news
habits. Finally, the boosting intervention yielded no significant
increase in belief accuracy over the control condition,
demonstrating that the boosting infographic was not successful
in helping people figure out what is true and what is false.
Exploratory analyses suggested that the intervention did,
however, inhibit a decline in trust in scientists as a source of
information about the coronavirus among more conservative,
Republican participants.
Comparison With Prior Work
There is a great deal of worry about the prevalence of
misinformation during the current pandemic, which is reflected
in popular media (eg, [36,37]), as well as among scientists (eg,
[38,39]) and public health agencies (eg, [4,40]). The supposed
COVID-19 infodemic is not reflected in US citizens’ beliefs.
The finding that most Americans hold quite accurate beliefs
about the COVID-19 pandemic is in line with emerging work
on perceptions of the pandemic that shows that belief in
COVID-19 misperceptions and conspiracy theories is quite low
[41-44]. Consequently, this calls into question the prevalence
of misinformation or the public’s susceptibility to
misinformation.
A convincing body of empirical work on the prevalence of
misinformation surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic is not
yet available. Research from before the COVID-19 pandemic
indicates that the prevalence of misinformation might be lower
than many believe [45-47]. Still, it is possible that the current
pandemic has led to an increase in misinformation compared
to the information landscape from before the pandemic.
However, when looking for potential explanations of this study’s
findings, we should consider the possibility that COVID-19
misinformation is not as prevalent as expected. Perhaps
misinformation makes up only a small portion of the average
US citizen’s media diet.
The second possibility is that we are indeed facing a COVID-19
infodemic, but that the public is not very susceptible to it.
Misinformation campaigns regarding other topics, such as
climate change and the health effects of tobacco [18,48], have
demonstrated that misinformation can contribute to
misperceptions about important matters. In these cases, however,
misinformation campaigns have been carefully organized and
executed, continually misinforming the public for decades. In
contrast, the COVID-19 pandemic is a novel issue and, at least
in the relatively early months that we investigated, did not yield
many such coordinated misinformation campaigns. Moreover,
the COVID-19 pandemic originated in a very different media
landscape than the climate change and tobacco misinformation
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campaigns. Fake news, misinformation, and disinformation
have been discussed widely and frequently in popular media
since the 2016 US presidential election and the 2016 United
Kingdom European Union membership referendum. This might
have resulted in the public being more aware of misinformation
campaigns targeting them. Perhaps the widespread discussion
of misinformation in popular media has worked as a large-scale
media literacy intervention, putting people on guard against
false information. In support of this idea, recent research has
demonstrated that simply asking one to consider the accuracy
of a claim improved subsequent choices about what COVID-19
news to share on social media [49].
A third possibility that should be considered is that the public
is more careful in forming beliefs in times of crisis, especially
in the relatively early days of a crisis, making a well-informed
public not unique to the COVID-19 pandemic. In times of crisis,
people are likely to increase news consumption (eg, [50]). This
was also the case in the United States during the first months
of the COVID-19 pandemic, with people reporting increased
news consumption [51]. Although we found that those who
reported CNN or Fox News as their main news source scored
below average on belief accuracy, the general increase in news
consumption may lead to a better understanding of the crisis
situation, including more accurate beliefs.
Turning to the finding that political orientation is associated
with individuals’ belief accuracy, we see that this is in line with
other emerging work [41]. There is likely a multitude of
explanations for this evolving partisan divide [52] regarding
perceptions about the pandemic, such as political party cues in
the news affecting opinion formation [53], the difficulty of
correcting false beliefs for the ideological group most likely to
hold those misperceptions [17], as well as the differences in
news consumption that are reflected in this study. A second
variable that is even more strongly related to belief accuracy is
trust in scientists as a source of information about the
coronavirus, demonstrating that higher trust is related to more
accurate beliefs. Interestingly, the associations of political
orientation and trust with accurate beliefs were partially
explained by an interaction effect among political orientation
and trust. The stronger association of trust with belief accuracy
for more liberal, Democratic individuals might mean that they
rely more on scientists’ perceptions in forming beliefs, while
relatively more conservative, Republican individuals might rely
more on other cues. Relatedly, the inhibited decline in trust in
scientists among conservative, Republican participants in the
boost condition could indicate that information about the
scientific process might resonate more with them than just
hearing the results of this process. Though this exploratory
finding should be replicated, it could provide a fruitful avenue
for further research on trust in scientists and political orientation.
In addition, this study demonstrates that some news sources
might be doing a worse job of informing their consumers about
the COVID-19 pandemic than others, or perhaps that
better-informed news consumers turn to different news sources
than less well-informed consumers, again in line with other
emerging work [41]. Most likely, a combination of both
selection and influence (eg, [54]) explain the differences in
belief accuracy found in this study. Interestingly, considering
the role of social media in the spread of misinformation (eg,
[55]), with about 26% to 42% of tweets in the data collection
period containing unreliable facts [56], participants who reported
social media sites as their main source of news about the
coronavirus did not display significantly worse belief accuracy
than others. However, it is possible that participants who
reported social media sites as their main source followed major
news outlets via the social media site, thereby being exposed
to similar news content as the other participants.
Finally, this study demonstrates the difficulty of crafting
interventions aimed at increasing belief accuracy. Recent work
demonstrates that simple, short media literacy interventions can
work [14,15], while other work highlights the difficulties of
crafting these interventions [16]. We argue that the divergent
findings can be explained by the fact that in the former work
the interventions were paired with corrections, while in this
study participants had to put their new skill to use outside of
the study context. Considering that cues signaling the existence
of consensus in relevant news content are very rare [57],
participants likely had to search for information about scientific
consensus themselves. The results from the manipulation check
indicated that only a relatively small portion of participants
actually applied this strategy. However, those individuals who
indicated that they did apply a strategy related to consensus
reasoning scored higher on belief accuracy than the control
group. This difference highlights the potential of the intervention
in situations where individuals can be empowered to actually
apply it.
Limitations
There are two notable limitations to this study. First, our belief
accuracy measure consisted only of science-based statements.
We incorporated only science-based claims in our study to
ensure that there was sufficient empirical evidence stating that
a claim was either true or false. However, this decision did
exclude some coronavirus-related claims that were not based
on science (eg, “Bill Gates patented the coronavirus”) or were
unresolved at the time (eg, “A vaccine will be available before
the end of the year”). It should have been harder for participants
to figure out whether such unresolved issues were true or not,
yielding different responses from participants for a measure
reflecting non-science-based, unresolved issues about the
pandemic.
A second limitation is the fact that the recruitment platform that
we used, Prolific, is known as a platform for research. Although
participants on the platform receive financial incentives for
completing studies, they might be more interested in scientific
research than the average US citizen. This could lead to them
also having a higher trust in science than the general population,
even though our sample was balanced regarding age, gender,
and ethnicity. As trust in science was highly related to belief
accuracy, it could be possible that this led to an inflated belief
accuracy score. Future research should attempt to replicate this
study with a sample that represents the US population better
than our balanced sample.
J Med Internet Res 2021 | vol. 23 | iss. 1 | e24069 | p. 11http://www.jmir.org/2021/1/e24069/
(page number not for citation purposes)




Our work demonstrates that most people are quite able to figure
out the facts in this time of crisis, but also that it is difficult to
craft an intervention targeting these beliefs. However, in cases
where people do not immediately have a clear understanding
of the facts, they are capable of figuring them out over time.
There are some factors that might make it easier or harder for
one to figure out the facts. We found that the accuracy of
participants’ beliefs was related to political orientation, as well
as their primary news source. This suggests that, even in the
relatively early days of the pandemic, political polarization and
media diet had a grip on US citizens’ factual beliefs, leading to
polarization along party lines. Another factor strongly related
to accurate beliefs about the pandemic was trust in scientists.
It is unclear whether an already-high trust led to accurate beliefs
or whether being able to figure out the facts increased trust in
scientists, but the importance of expert communication is
underlined by these findings.
Although a small but robust correlation suggests that accurate
beliefs about the pandemic might be important for
coronavirus-related behavior, the role of misinformation in the
pandemic seems to be relatively small, either because it is rare
or because it is unable to persuade. However, we note that even
if misinformation is not prevalent and only accepted by a small
portion of the receivers, it can still be dangerous. To illustrate,
we found that almost all participants in this study disregarded
the statement that injecting or ingesting bleach is a safe way to
kill the coronavirus, but this false claim is reported to have cost
at least one life [58]. Additionally, with the antivaccine
community launching coordinated misinformation campaigns
against potential coronavirus vaccines [59] and politicization
of the pandemic looming, the infodemic might become a much
bigger threat.
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